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Conjoined Twins and Catholic Moral Analysis:
Extraordinary Means and
Casuistical Consistency
ABSTRACT. This article draws upon the Roman Catholic distinction between
“ordinary” and “extraordinary” means of medical treatment to analyze the case
of “Jodie” and “Mary,” the Maltese conjoined twins whose surgical separation
was ordered by the English courts over the objection of their Roman Catholic
parents and Cormac Murphy-O’Connor, the Roman Catholic Cardinal Arch-
bishop of Westminster. It attempts to shed light on the use of that distinction by
surrogate decision makers with respect to incompetent patients. In addition, it
critically analyzes various components of the distinction by comparing the rea-
soning used by Catholic moralists in this case with the reasoning used in other
cases that raise similar issues, including women facing crisis pregnancies who
prefer abortion to adoption and the Indiana “Baby Doe” case.
APAIR OF CONJOINED TWINS, known by the pseudonyms of“Jodie” and “Mary,” were born in a Manchester, England, hos-pital in August 2000. Mary’s heart and lungs were essentially
non- functioning; she was entirely dependent upon her connection with
her stronger sister for survival. But Jodie’s cardiovascular system could
not continue to do the work necessary to support both babies indefinitely.
Physicians predicted that without an operation to separate the twins, both
babies soon would die, probably before their first birthday. Unfortunately,
however, the surgical separation would be able to save only Jodie. Al-
though likely to need several reconstructive operations, she was predicted
to live a long and virtually normal life once her body was liberated from
the burden of providing life support to her sister. Mary’s fate would be
very different; she was predicted to die in the course of the procedure (Re
A (children) (conjoined twins) (Ward LJ) [2000] 4 All ER 961).1
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Deep disagreement arose between the babies’ physicians and their par-
ents about whether to perform the operation, which ultimately was played
out not only in the English court system, but also in the glare of the inter-
national media. The parents, who had journeyed from their native Malta
to Manchester for more sophisticated medical care once they discovered
that the pregnancy involved conjoined twins, objected to the operation
on a number of grounds, some of them explicitly religious. Devout Catho-
lics, they judged the operation morally impermissible, in part because
they believed it entailed killing Mary to save Jodie. They were supported
in their opposition to the procedure by Cormac Murphy-O’Connor (2000),
the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, who submitted a statement to
the Court of Appeal raising a number of objections both to the procedure
itself and to any order to proceed with it over the strong objections of the
babies’ parents. Nonetheless, the three judges of the Court unanimously
decided to authorize the operation, which was performed on 6 November
2000 (Dyer 2000). As expected, Mary died in the 20-hour operation. As
hoped, a healthy Jodie returned home to Malta with her parents less than
eight months later (Peachey 2001).
The saga of Jodie and Mary has captured our hearts because we cannot
ignore the plight of two helpless babies born in the most tragic circum-
stances imaginable. It also has captured our minds, because coming to a
judgment about the babies’ fate requires us to face a host of difficult and
interlocking moral and legal issues. First, was the operation morally per-
missible, or was the harm it did to Mary morally objectionable in some
respect? Second, assuming that there are no grounds to say that the op-
eration was morally impermissible because of its lethal implications for
Mary, can one take the further step of concluding that it was morally
required because it would save Jodie’s life? Third, should the physicians
have been given judicial authorization to proceed with the operation over
the strong objections of the parents?
In this essay, I focus on the issues surrounding the second question, in
conversation with those working within the framework of Roman Catholic
tradition of medical-moral reasoning. Catholic moralists are divided about
whether the operation was impermissible because it counted as the inten-
tional killing or mutilation of Mary or because it was unfair to her in
some other respect. For those who conclude that the operation was not
morally precluded on those grounds, the second question arises: Was the
operation merely morally permissible, or was it morally required because
of its potential benefits to Jodie? In addressing this question, a significant
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number of Catholic moralists have maintained that it was permissible but
not required, drawing upon the tradition’s distinction between “ordinary”
and “extraordinary” means of preserving life or health. As I shall con-
tend in more detail below, some of the arguments that have been used—
or at least endorsed—in reaching this conclusion stand in significant ten-
sion with the way that many of these same moralists would be likely to
approach closely related issues involving life or death for the unborn or
newly born infants. Placing these closely related issues in juxtaposition
enables one to reflect critically upon the tacit assumptions that guide dis-
cussions of these matters.
ORDINARY AND EXTRAORDINARY MEANS
The Roman Catholic medical-moral tradition has long distinguished
between “ordinary” (sometimes called “proportionate”) and “extraordi-
nary” (sometimes called “disproportionate”) means of preserving one’s
life or health; the former are morally required, while the latter are op-
tional. Ordinary means are those that “offer a reasonable hope of benefit
and do not entail an excessive burden or impose excessive expense on the
family or the community” (NCCB 2001, no. 56). Extraordinary means
are those that “do not offer a reasonable hope of benefit or entail an
excessive burden or impose excessive expense on the family or the com-
munity” (NCCB 2001, no. 57).
The test of whether a particular means of preserving life is ordinary or
extraordinary is what lawyers would call a “facts and circumstances test,”
which takes into account a wide array of benefits and burdens. With re-
spect to benefits, the focus generally is broad; the question is how effec-
tive the treatment would be in the context of the whole condition of the
patient, not how effective it would be in ameliorating the very specific
ailment at which it is targeted. For example, one is not obliged to un-
dergo open heart surgery, even if the procedure would be effective in clear-
ing an arterial blockage, if one also has terminal cancer. With respect to
burdens, the approach is similarly broad-minded. In some cases, the means
themselves can be burdensome, either in a concrete physical sense—e.g.,
the procedure in question is very painful—or in an more holistic sense
that is sensitive to the patient’s values—e.g., some eighteenth-century ca-
suists argued that a consecrated virgin need not preserve her life if so
doing required her to be treated by a male physician. The tradition also
recognizes that a particular means can impose a wide variety of other
burdens, ranging from excessive expense, to the emotional repugnance
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many people experience at the thought of physical mutilation, to pro-
longed separation from familiar places and people (Wildes 1996). Signifi-
cantly, the range of morally cognizable burdens include not only those
that fall on the patient, but also those that fall on the family and the
community.
What is the purpose of the distinction between ordinary and extraordi-
nary means, and the way in which the lines between them tend to be
drawn? In my view, the distinction gains full intelligibility only when placed
against the backdrop of the theologically informed anthropology tacitly
assumed by Catholic casuists. Two principles in particular seem to be of
overriding importance. First, a human being’s ultimate worth lies not in
the transient instrumental value of her mental or physical attributes, but
in her fundamental nature as a being created in the image and likeness of
God and called to eternal fellowship with God. Consequently, all human
beings have a transcendent value that makes them fundamentally equal in
dignity. Second, precisely because human beings have an eternal destiny,
mortal life and health are goods, but not absolute goods. Against this
backdrop, a patient’s decision to forgo ordinary means of preserving life
raises concerns that she is attempting to kill herself by deliberate omis-
sion—e.g., a lovelorn diabetic who decides to commit suicide by forgoing
insulin. At the very least, it generates worries that she does not suffi-
ciently value her life as a precious gift from God. In contrast, a decision to
omit extraordinary means suggests not that a patient has failed to appre-
ciate the real goodness of this mortal existence, but rather that she has
understood that its value is not absolute.
The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services
state that patients in Catholic health care facilities, provided they are com-
petent, are to make the decision regarding whether a particular means is
ordinary or extraordinary (NCCB 2001, nos. 56 & 57).2  What about
incompetent patients? Who decides for them and according to what crite-
ria? This question has been debated vigorously in a way that starkly re-
veals the potential tension between the two anthropological principles
discussed in the foregoing paragraph. It is one thing to decide to accept
death for oneself because the burdens of treatment outweigh its expected
benefits; it is another thing entirely to make that decision with respect to
an incompetent patient who has been placed in one’s care. As the heated
debate about such issues as artificial nutrition and hydration for PVS
patients demonstrates, making quality of life judgments that determine
whether another person will live or die can sometimes be perceived to be
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in tension with one’s commitment to the importance of affirming the sanc-
tity of life. Nevertheless, someone must make quality of life judgments on
behalf of incompetent patients; otherwise they are condemned to the po-
tential cruelties of preserving their lives by any medical means available
at any cost—even to their own well-being.
How, then, does one distinguish morally appropriate and morally in-
appropriate quality of life judgments in the case of incompetent patients?
In my view, three basic concerns underlie the reservations about surro-
gates making quality of life judgments for incompetent patients. First,
there is the fear that, in assessing benefits and burdens to the patient,
surrogate decision makers will inappropriately import their own feelings
about the patient’s situation. For example, while a mentally handicapped
patient might be quite content with her life, a decision maker might inap-
propriately attribute to that patient her own expected sense of loss of self-
worth were she suddenly to find herself mentally handicapped (and know
the difference). A second worry is that surrogate decision makers—many
of whom are family members of the patient—will inappropriately privi-
lege their own interests and desires relative to the interests of the patient.
Although both of these worries suggest real dangers, they are fundamen-
tally pragmatic in nature, pointing to specific instantiations of drawbacks
that are always associated with the use of decision makers who may be
self-interested or even broadly self-centered.
The third concern, however, is different in nature. Perhaps the decision
makers will count as “benefits” or “burdens” certain consequences of the
decision which should not objectively be placed in such a category, al-
though they may well be experienced as such subjectively by those af-
fected by the decision. In the case of defective newborns, for example, the
debate about burdens clusters around two sets of questions. Is it always
morally acceptable to take into account the distinct difficulties to parents
and society that caring for a seriously handicapped child will entail? Or is
it the case that promoting and protecting the overriding values of uncon-
ditional parental love and societal acceptance of all persons as equal in
fundamental worth morally require us to refrain from treating at least
some of these difficulties as “burdens” that justify a decision not to pro-
ceed with life-saving medical treatment, no matter how sincerely they are
experienced as such? Second, is it morally acceptable to take into account
the stigma and discrimination that a patient and her family will unavoid-
ably experience as a result of her being handicapped in a society that
values conformity and competence, or should we expect them courageously
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to face down such adverse perceptions as a cost associated with their
contribution to building a more just society? As I argue below, these con-
siderations become acutely important in considering whether the surgical
separation of Mary and Jodie constituted an ordinary or extraordinary
means of preserving Jodie’s life.
SAVING JODIE’S LIFE: ORDINARY OR EXTRAORDINARY MEANS?
What light does the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary
means shed upon the question of whether the surgical separation of Jodie
and Mary was morally required or merely morally permissible? It is im-
portant to remember that discussion of this question within the Catholic
medical-moral tradition requires that the lexically prior question about
the operation’s moral acceptability has already been answered in the af-
firmative. More specifically, the legitimacy of the discussion depends upon
the prior conclusion that (1) the operation did not constitute the inten-
tional killing of Mary; and that (2) the operation was not otherwise un-
just or unfair to Mary. In my view, that two-pronged conclusion is cor-
rect. The intent or purpose of the operation was to separate the babies;
Mary’s death figured neither as an end nor as a means in the surgical
team’s actions; it was a foreseen and unintended side effect. In addition,
going forward with the operation was not unfair to Mary. I have argued
elsewhere that our conception of what is fair in this situation depends in
part upon whether we draw upon a view of embodiment that stresses
bodily distinctness or one that affirms the value of bodily relatedness as a
type of personal relatedness (Kaveny 2001). Although the two views would
not necessarily yield the same conclusion in a different case, in this situa-
tion they converge to support the operation. The former view would give
great weight to Jodie’s right to be free of a physical connection to Mary
that not only impinges upon her bodily integrity, but also saps her very
lifeblood. The latter view, although less negative about permanent physi-
cal connection and even dependence between conjoined twins, would jus-
tify the operation in this case on the grounds that both babies soon would
be dead without it.
Given that the operation was morally permissible, was it also morally
required? The benefits of the operation to Jodie were simple, straightfor-
ward, and considerable. Without it, she soon would die; with it, she likely
would lead a normal or virtually normal life. The burdens of the opera-
tion require a more nuanced assessment, however. Direct burdens include
the difficulties associated with the surgery itself. Clearly falling in this
KAVENY • CONJOINED TWINS AND CATHOLIC MORAL ANALYSIS
[  121  ]
category are the grueling nature of the procedure—it took 20 hours to
perform—and the inevitable uncertainty associated with major, and by
no means routine, surgery. Ancillary burdens include the expense of the
procedure, for society if not for the family (although social expense may
have been offset by the knowledge gained during the procedure), as well
as the long and difficult separation from family and homeland required
of the twins’ parents in order to be with their surviving daughter through
the ordeal of her recovery. The prospective need for further medical treat-
ment down the road raises the possibility of additional burdens on the
child, family, and society.
Finally, is it morally legitimate to allow certain quality of life considerations
to enter into the equation? In keeping with the three concerns identified
in the preceding section, one must ask whether the parents, as surrogate
decision makers, gave too much weight to their own interests and well-
being, as well as whether they overestimated the social difficulties that
Jodie’s unique status as the surviving member of a pair of conjoined twins
would pose for her. In addition, is it morally acceptable to count as “bur-
dens” two factors that the parents clearly considered to be such. In other
words: (1) What weight, if any, should be given to the parental suffering
that would have ensued if they had been required permanently to relin-
quish custody of Jodie to an English family in order for her obtain the
medical treatment she needed? And (2) what weight, if any, should be
given to the possible social stigma that Jodie might have encountered
growing up as a handicapped child in Malta? It is to these two questions
that I turn in the remainder of the paper.
THE BURDEN OF FAMILIAL SEPARATION
In addition to worries about Mary’s fate, the parents offered several
considerations pertaining to Jodie’s post-operative situation as reasons
against proceeding with the surgical separation. One consideration was
the worry that they would be forced by circumstances to leave her perma-
nently in England so that she could receive proper treatment while they
returned to Malta.
[W]e have also had to give very careful consideration to leaving Jodie in
England, should she survive, to be looked after by other people. . . . It
would be an extremely difficult if not impossible decision for us to reach,
but again we have to be strong and realistic about matters and understand
that certainly Jodie would receive far better care and importantly the re-
quired medical treatment should she continue to reside in England. We do
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not know if it is possible or feasible for Jodie to remain in England as
opposed to her being taken home. We do not know if it is possible or fea-
sible for her to be fostered by another family so that we can have an in-
volvement in her upkeeping or whether she would have to be adopted and
we could have no contact with her at all. That would break our hearts. (Re
A (children) (conjoined twins) (Ward LJ) [2000] 4 All ER 961, 986)
The parent’s articulation of this burden seems to have passed with nary
a critical word from most, if not all, of the Catholic moralists who con-
sidered the case. Although Cardinal Murphy-O’Connor’s belief that the
surgical separation was unjust to Mary constituted the primary source of
his opposition, his submission to the Court of Appeal also clearly reflects
the judgment that the operation would be an “extraordinary” means that
should not be imposed upon the family.3  Other Catholic moralists pass
over this aspect of the parents’ objection to the procedure without com-
ment or even uncritically incorporate it into their own analysis (see, e.g.,
Gormally 2001; Lysaught 2000; May 2001; Sulmasy 2000).4
This omission of critical scrutiny is surprising, because the parents’
arguments on this point bear a striking resemblance to arguments put
forward by women facing crisis pregnancies who choose to have an abor-
tion rather than to give up their babies for adoption. In Rachel Weeping,
James T. Burtchaell (1984) quotes extensively from women who express
this perspective. Taken together, the quoted passages reflect the strong
the sense that putting a child up for adoption is unfair not only to the
woman, but also to the child.
No, I don’t approve of that! Not at all. I have very strong feelings about
that. I think you have no right to do that to another human being. I don’t
think you have any right at all to create a human being and give it away.
(Burtchaell 1984, p. 25)
Statistics suggest that about half of all unintended pregnancies end in
abortion. Approximately 2 percent of such pregnancies result in a live
birth followed by an adoption; the vast majority of women who decide to
carry their pregnancies to term choose to raise their children themselves
(Chandra et al. 1999; Alan Guttmacher Institute 2001, 1999; Hsu 1996).
What can be learned from the juxtaposition of the reasoning of the
parents of the conjoined twins and that of the women who stated their
moral preference for abortion over adoption? Two important insights can
be gleaned. First, I think that the medical-moral tradition on “extraordi-
nary” means can help one to appreciate more sympathetically the moral
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repugnance that many women feel at the prospect of permanently relin-
quishing their children through adoption. By recognizing that a treat-
ment that can take one permanently away from one’s family is an “ex-
traordinary” means, the Catholic medical-moral tradition itself
acknowledges that separation from one’s closest relatives can work great
hardship upon persons. No one suggests, for example, that all parents in
developing countries have a moral obligation to send their critically ill
children permanently to the United States or the United Kingdom in or-
der to obtain life-saving treatment for them, even if it were practicable for
them to do so. Tacitly underlying the judgment that it would be wrong to
impose such a requirement upon parents is the sense that the shape of
one’s life can be at least as crucial as its length. A baby who is born, lives
a short while, and dies within the bosom of her family and village lives a
good life, even if not the best one. A baby who is sent to a far-away land
for medical treatment may live a longer life, but not necessarily a better
one, if all ties to her family and culture are permanently severed as a
result.
One might object, however, that death, no less than permanent separa-
tion, breaks a family apart. Why should not there be an automatic prefer-
ence for the option that allows the child to live? This is not an easy ques-
tion to answer. Indeed, both the twins’ case and the case of abortion present
the strongest imaginable claim for the preferability of permanent familial
separation; in both cases, the parents’ relationship with the baby in ques-
tion has not had as much time to develop as in other cases of separation,
and in both cases there is a stark difference in outcome for the babies:
death versus a long and relatively normal life in an adoptive family. Fur-
thermore, in both the case of the twins’ parents and the case of women
who choose abortion over adoption, some all-too-human but less-than-
praiseworthy desire to make the problem “disappear” through the death
of the child may be exerting its influence. In both cases, therefore, there is
reason to worry about self-interested decision makers inappropriately
preferring their own interests over those of their children—a legitimate
worry in “quality-of-life” decision making with respect to incompetent
patients, as noted above.
But more laudatory motives may be admixed as well. A parent may not
wish the death of the child per se, but may privilege familial loyalty in a
way that makes abandonment a fate worse than death. This kind of loy-
alty is embedded in our tacit conception of the role-related obligations of
family members. We do not want our loved ones to give up on us too
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soon, we do not want to encourage an “out of sight, out of mind” con-
ception of how relatives should perceive their bonds to one another, par-
ticularly in an era where family members are dispersed all over the coun-
try and even the globe. Nor do we want a conception of family loyalty to
depend upon similarities in education, values, and lifestyles, particularly
in a highly socially mobile society such as our own. The strength of famil-
ial bonds and the importance of familial devotedness—particularly of
parents to children—are things that we hope will transcend separation
and differences of this sort. Yet these are precisely the sorts of separation
and difference that are likely to be at issue between birth parents and a
child they relinquish to be raised by adoptive parents.
In short, on a coherent role-related understanding of the meaning of
familial loyalty, one might hold that the duties of family members to one
another are completely extinguished only by death. According to such a
view, both the twins’ parents and the women facing crisis pregnancies
who are morally repelled by the prospect of adoption express a similar
sense of role-related obligations. They all believe that the maternal obli-
gations of a woman who has died are extinguished in a way that those of
a woman who has permanently separated herself from her child are not.
The first in some sense has “fulfilled” her role; the second in some sense
has “abandoned” it.
One might object that a legal adoption proceeding terminates a paren-
tal relationship just as absolutely as death does. The response is that while
law may have the power instantaneously to create and extinguish rela-
tionships de jure, de facto relationships are not quite so malleable to legal
commands. More specifically, death is widely perceived to end—or at
least to transform—the role-related obligations of family members in a
way that mere termination of rights in a legal proceeding does not. Women
who consider abortion to be a morally and psychologically better option
than adoption may be expressing something of this sense as they reflect
upon their options for dealing with a crisis pregnancy.
My second point is that there seems to be some dissonance in the way
that Catholic moral thought has responded to the twins’ parents, on the
one hand, and to women facing crisis pregnancies, on the other, with
respect to the prospect of permanent separation from their living chil-
dren. Although criticism of the twins’ parents on this point has been ex-
tremely muted if not entirely absent, pregnant women who express greater
abhorrence of adoption than of abortion or raising the child on their own
have not infrequently been criticized as selfish or unduly emotional in
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their decision-making procedures. Burtchaell’s own moral assessment of
the stories he recounts offers a good example of the kind of judgment I
have in mind:
But what of this vehemently negative view regarding adoption, this moral
outrage that so many of the women express. The women who reject adop-
tion as either hurtful to their offspring or hurtful to themselves reveal in
their remarks this tendency to consider children as proprietary objects. They
are desired or annulled as the mother wishes, very much to suit her plans or
needs. (Burtchaell 1984, p. 26)
What accounts for the difference in treatment? In asking this question,
I do not mean to deny, of course, that abortion and forgoing life-saving
treatment are not morally different in many respects. In many cases (but
not all), abortion involves intentional killing; in many cases (but not all),
a decision to forgo life-saving treatment involves accepting the child’s
death as a foreseen but unintended side effect of an action whose primary
purpose is legitimate. At this point in his argument, however, Burtchaell’s
focus is not on the other morally salient aspects of abortion, but upon the
fact that in choosing abortion rather than adoption, so many women
appear to prefer the death of their children to permanent separation from
them.
Why, then, do we seem inclined to accept so uncritically the claim of
the twins’ parents that permanent separation would be worse than death
while dismissing similar claims of women with crisis pregnancies? Per-
haps we are operating with a conception of parenthood—particularly of
motherhood—that is too morally simplistic and that fails to account for
the admixture of self-gift and self-interest that exists in all human hearts—
even in the hearts of mothers. From the perspective of basic Catholic
teaching on marriage and the family, the credentials of the twins’ mother
as a “good mother” were unimpeachable. She followed the appropriate
course of behavior for responsible parenthood; she got married, she and
her husband built a life together, she became pregnant, and she moni-
tored the pregnancy in joyful anticipation of the birth—until she discov-
ered she was carrying conjoined twins.
In contrast, many women who find themselves facing crisis pregnan-
cies do not follow the course of action prescribed by Catholic teaching.
They engage in premarital or extramarital sex; their pregnancies are not
only unanticipated, but also are undesired; and they contemplate abor-
tion as a way out of a difficult situation. Because their actions do not
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comport with the ideal of marriage and family life, it may be tempting to
assume that such women have no morally worthy maternal instincts at
all. By immediately dismissing as “selfish” the deep moral repugnance
that such women express regarding the permanent separation involved in
adoption, we in effect deny that they have become “mothers”—that they
have or could ever develop any true maternal feelings for the unborn
children they carry.
In my view, the moral reality in both cases is probably more ambigu-
ous. Blinded by the fact that the twins’ mother’s dilemma was generated
by no “wrongful act” on her part, we may brush too quickly over the
possibility that denial, fear, and grief for her nonexistent ideal babies might
lead her—as it might lead many of us—to look for the easier way out, the
way to make the entire situation “go away.” At the same time, we may
too easily use the fact that the plight of women facing crisis pregnancies is
in part of their own making to dismiss the concerns of the many of them
who find adoption more morally repugnant than abortion—who find sepa-
ration worse than death. Instead, drawing upon the analogy with end-of-
life decision making, we might just as well see it as confirmation that
some form of the “maternal instinct” can arise—by nature—even in cir-
cumstances where the role of mother is not voluntarily chosen or immedi-
ately welcomed by the woman in question.
We might begin to question also the easy assumption that childbirth
followed by adoption is the “best” solution for the unborn child and her
mother. In effect, by too quickly assuming that the best way to handle a
crisis pregnancy is adoption, we make the assumption that a woman can
choose not to be a mother after she has conceived—provided the choice is
made after birth. We also confer on positive law a power to break and
remake families that is not commonly recognized by the natural law tra-
dition of jurisprudence associated with Roman Catholic thought. More
specifically, we assume that the power of positive law is not limited by
natural ties of blood and affection; we believe, naively, that it can step in
and redefine familial relationships—with no cost, loss, or remainder. We
give priority to restoring a certain appearance of order, by assuming that
it is possible easily to take apart and recombine the components of “child-
less couple” and “single mother and her baby” so that we are left with the
morally more gratifying categories of “loving family” and “single woman.”
The dismal statistics on adoption rates suggest that such recombina-
tions are not often desired by women facing crisis pregnancies. Perhaps
more consideration should be given to the possibility that the recombined
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categories do not accord with the underlying realities of the relationships
at stake. An understanding of pregnancy as a time when a woman devel-
ops a deep bond with the child she carries, along with an appreciation of
the role-related obligations of family members, particularly parents, may
give us some sense of why this may the case, and why it may not be
entirely bad. Perhaps, then, those who would like to reduce the number
of abortions in this country would do well to develop and encourage
ways to transfer child-rearing responsibilities that do not pressure birth
mothers to “give up” all contact with the children they bear. In addition,
instead of viewing the abhorrence that a woman facing a crisis pregnancy
may feel at the prospect of relinquishing her baby after birth as confirma-
tion of her “selfishness,” perhaps it could be viewed as a morally benefi-
cial instinct that provides a contact point, a bit of common ground from
which to begin to explore other ways of handling the situation. Upon
reflection, adopting much the same approach might have proven benefi-
cial with the mother of Jodie and Mary—affirming her desire not to be
permanently separated from her only living daughter, but also exploring
whether allowing Jodie to die is really the only alternative to such separa-
tion, or the alternative that is most consistent with her love for her child
in this situation. In my view, the answers to these questions in the end
must be “no.”
THE “BURDEN” OF DISCRIMINATION
The parents of Jodie and Mary offered another reason why the surgical
separation should not be performed: If she survived, Jodie’s quality of life
on Malta would not be very good. In addition to not receiving first-rate
medical care, she would face a lifetime of discrimination because of the
circumstances of her birth and any remaining postoperative disabilities
she suffered (Allen 2001). The first concern, addressed in the preceding
section, raised the question of whether it would be fair to expect the fam-
ily to relinquish custody of Jodie so that she could remain England. The
second concern, addressed here, pertains to the potential burden of future
discrimination against Jodie.
In an interview given at the time when Jodie was allowed to return
home to Malta, about seven months after the operation, her mother spoke
of the difficulties she faced at first in accepting her new daughters. “At
the beginning it was so hard for us to see them like that. I didn’t want to
touch them. I was afraid of them. It took days before I could” (Allen
2001). Slowly, the parents said, they got used to their daughters; they
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began to love them. Nonetheless, one factor in the decision about whether
to authorize the surgical separation was the treatment that Jodie would
receive if she returned to her native land. “Nobody likes handicapped
people on Malta. They are hidden away. In the old days, it was seen as a
sign that you had done something to deserve this” (Allen 2001).
The attitude of the twins’ parents toward raising a handicapped child
on Malta was explicitly identified as one of the reasons for their opposi-
tion to the operation in the lower court opinion that prompted Cardinal
Murphy-O’Connor’s intervention in the case (High Court Justice-Family
Division 2000, p. 5). Nonetheless, their perspective passed without criti-
cism from virtually all the Catholic moralists who considered the case,
including the Cardinal himself.5  Their silence is somewhat surprising, since
the parents’s views on this point seem to raise the specter of invidious
quality-of-life judgments far more vividly than other cases that have been
widely criticized on just this point. For example, consider the famous
“Baby Doe” case that transpired in Indiana in the spring of 1982. The
baby boy was born with an esophageal atresia and tracheoesophageal
fistula. The upper end of his esophagus was not connected to his stom-
ach, but instead emptied into a pouch. At the same time, the lower end of
the baby’s esophagus—arising from the stomach—connected directly to
his windpipe. The parents were told by the obstetrician that they could
save the baby’s life by performing a surgical procedure to repair his tra-
chea and esophagus. However, it was a “rigorous” operation that was
accompanied by significant pain and that might require follow-up sur-
gery in the years to come (Lyon 1985, pp. 26–27).
Baby Doe’s parents refused to consent to the procedure. For them, the
decisive factor was not the nature of the operation itself, but the state of
their baby after the operation. He was born with Down’s syndrome, which
no surgical procedure could repair. At the judicial hearing, the father tes-
tified that he had taught public school for more than seven years and had
on occasion worked closely with children with Down’s syndrome and
other handicaps. According to the court, he and his wife “felt that a mini-
mally acceptable quality of life was never present for a child suffering
from such a condition” (Indiana. Circuit Court of the County of Monroe
1986, p. 79). The court supported the parents’ decision, holding that they
were making a legitimate choice between two medically recommended
courses of treatment—surgery and no surgery.
The Baby Doe case set off a public firestorm regarding the selective
nontreatment of handicapped newborns, which culminated in the pas-
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sage of the Reagan administration’s “Baby Doe” regulations. The discus-
sion in the ethical literature regarding handicapped newborns is extensive
and complicated;6  I do not propose to engage it here except to raise a
comparative point. For many Catholic ethicists, including those who agree
that nontreatment of newborns would be permissible in more extreme
cases, the Indiana Baby Doe case was the paradigm of an unjustified deci-
sion not to treat; they did not consider the burdens associated with be-
ing—and raising—a child with Down’s syndrome to be so significant that
they warranted a decision to allow the baby’s esophageal and tracheal
defects to go uncorrected.
It is arguable, however, that if one focuses on comparative medical
prognoses, a decision not to treat Jodie would be even more problematic
than the decision not to treat Baby Doe. True, the surgical separation
itself was invasive and extensive. Nonetheless, in the context of a full-
blown adversarial proceeding conducted before the Court of Appeal, the
testimony that the surgery was very likely to be successful was uncontra-
dicted. The doctors fully expected Jodie to walk one day; in the worst-
case scenario, she might have needed a crutch or possibly a wheelchair.
They were a little more cautious about her gaining bowel control, as well
as about the success of vaginal reconstructive surgery; nonetheless, their
prognosis on these matters was extremely positive. In essence, they fully
expected her to live a normal life (Re A (children) (conjoined twins) (Ward
LJ) [2000] 4 All ER 961, 979–82). In contrast, Baby Doe’s medical prog-
nosis was more mixed.7  Without treatment, both babies were predicted
to die an uncomfortable death, which could be alleviated to some degree
by palliative measures (Lyon 1985, pp. 33–35; Re A, pp. 979–80).
Factors other than medical prognosis also suggest that a decision not
to not to treat Jodie would be more morally problematic than the deci-
sion not to treat Baby Doe. A better case can be made that the burdens at
stake for the parents of Baby Doe included a host of financial and familial
difficulties that might ensue if his medical prognosis was as bad as it
seemed to be to some physicians involved in the case. In contrast, it is
arguable that the long-term burdens at stake for Jodie’s parents if she
lived were far more likely to be limited to the incremental difficulties and
shame associated with having a less-than-perfect child whose circumstances
of birth were extremely unusual.8
In short, despite the fact that the burdens associated with Jodie’s con-
tinued life seem to be paradigmatic of the sort that should not be recog-
nized as morally legitimate considerations—e.g., fear of societal preju-
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dice against persons with disabilities—this aspect of the situation received
virtually no attention from the Roman Catholic moralists who might most
be expected to express concern about it—including the Roman Catholic
Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster in his submission to the Court of
Appeal. Why did this question not receive the attention it deserved?
In my view, the explanation is rooted in the way that the lower court
judge chose to characterize the legal issue at stake. Needless to say, the
situation was virtually without precedent both legally and morally; there
was no line of clearly relevant cases for the judge to draw upon. Johnson
J. therefore needed to frame the question in a way that would make sense
within an already established line of English law. Focusing upon the fact
that the surgical separation would deprive Mary of the life support she
received from Jodie, he decided to treat the case as if it were analogous to
a decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from an incompetent
patient. On this issue, he could find precedent. In the leading English case
on this question, Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] AC 789, the House
of Lords decided that doctors may withdraw life-sustaining treatment
from an incompetent patient if it is in the best interests of the patient to do
so. Having framed the question in this manner, Johnson J. then proceeded
to justify the operation on the grounds that it was in Mary’s best interest
to have the life support provided by her sister withdrawn from her.
In my view, much of the hostility that the decision to separate the twins
received from Catholic quarters can be traced to the fact that it was framed
as a Bland case by the lower court. Bland has come under heavy fire from
leading English Catholic legal scholars and moralists (see, e.g., Finnis 1993;
Keown 1997). The root of the their difficulties with the case lies in the
action theory it adopts. The Catholic tradition defines intention in terms
of purpose, not in terms of any degree of foresight. Consequently, on the
Catholic view, it is possible for a good physician to make a determination
to withhold or withdraw life-preserving treatment from a patient without
intending to kill that patient. Such a physician would intend simply to
stop the overly burdensome or insufficiently beneficial treatment; she would
not intend the patient’s death but rather would foresee it as an inevitable
side effect of her action. In contrast, English law collapses the distinction
between intended and foreseen effects; at least in the context of voluntary
homicide, an effect foreseen by the agent as a “virtually certain” consequence
of her action is an intended effect (see Reg. v. Woollin [1999] 1 A.C. 82).
From the perspective of Catholic moralists and legal scholars such as
John Finnis and John Keown, the Bland decision entailed two very prob-
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lematic claims. First, it wrongly implied that physicians who withdraw
life-preserving treatment from patients inevitably intend their deaths. Sec-
ond, it dangerously claimed that it is legitimate for them to withhold
treatment with that intention, provided that dying is in the best interests
of the patient. The critics denied that it is ever morally permissible—or
should ever be legally justified—to aim at the death of an innocent per-
son, even if one’s act is classified legally as an “omission.” They con-
tended that by adopting the death of another human being as the object
of an intentional action, an agent inevitably sets herself over and above
the other as the arbitrator of the value of the other’s life. Consequently,
they feared that by giving social sanction to this description of physicians’
actions in withholding treatment, the Bland case inevitably would en-
courage invidious quality-of-life judgments inconsistent with a fundamental
anthropological commitment to the equal dignity of all human beings.
A close examination of the Murphy-O’Connor statement reveals that
these are precisely the concerns that animate his consideration of the case
of the conjoined twins. More specifically, homing in on the fact that
Johnson J. decided to use the Bland framework to resolve the legal issues
involved in the separation, he looks for—and seemingly finds—Bland-
type problems in the Johnson opinion. Seeing the situation as a Bland
case, he looks for invidious quality-of-life judgments to be made with
respect to the patient from whom life support is being withdrawn—i.e.,
Mary. Cardinal Murphy-O’Connor writes, for example, that “Johnson
J.’s reasoning invites several criticisms. . . . It is seriously unreasonable to
seek to justify the ending of someone’s life on the grounds that that hu-
man being’s life lacks value or worth, so that he or she would be better off
dead” (Murphy-O’Connor 2000, p. 271; see also Gormally 2001, pp.
42–43).
In my view, Cardinal Murphy-O’Connor’s criticisms of Bland—and
the action theory it endorses—are justified. It may not have been wise,
however, to extend them so quickly to Mr. Justice Johnson’s opinion in
the conjoined twins case. In so doing, one may fail to account for the
limited jurisprudential options actually available to him. What would seem
to many Catholic moralists to be the best option for resolving the case—
a “double effect” argument that the physicians performing the operation
would foresee but not intend Mary’s death—was simply not a realistic
possibility, given the current state of English law.
Practically speaking, Johnson J. unfortunately was forced to choose
between two unsatisfactory jurisprudential options: either he could argue
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that the operation was a justified withdrawal of life support from Mary,
or he could maintain that it was an intentional homicide justified by the
necessity defense—which was the route eventually followed by the Court
of Appeal. Arguably, by adopting the first option, Johnson J. took the
route that posed the lesser harm to fundamental moral and jurispruden-
tial values. The second approach would have required him to take the
unprecedented step of straightforwardly arguing that the necessity de-
fense can be available to justify intentional killing of the innocent, a claim
that would have been unprecedented not only in Catholic moral theol-
ogy, but also in English law. The first approach, for all its flaws,9  at least
did not make new law. The worst that can be said about it is that it did
not correct defects in existing law, namely Bland. Making that sort of
correction, however, particularly in the context of an extremely unusual
case, is not the job of a lower court judge.
If one understands Johnson J. as attempting to make the best of a bad
jurisprudential situation, rather than as opportunistically extending the
presuppositions of Bland into new aspects of medical-moral decision
making, one can find much in his opinion that is congenial to a Catholic
perspective on end-of-life issues. More specifically, if his opinion is read
as a whole in this light, it seems not only to be very respectful of Mary’s
dignity as a human person, but also to be making treatment decisions on
her behalf in a way that is highly consistent with the Catholic distinction
between ordinary and extraordinary means. More specifically, it affirms
the equal dignity of all human beings, while simultaneously recognizing
that one need not always give priority to preserving one’s mortal life at
the expense of other values.
Physicians testified both before the lower court and the Court of Ap-
peal that Mary’s state at birth was very different than Jodie’s. Not only
were her heart and lungs essentially nonfunctional, she was severely brain-
damaged. Under no possible scenario would she have the prospect of a
normal life span—much less a normal life—before her. With the opera-
tion, she would die instantaneously and painlessly during the course of
the surgical separation. Without it, she might live for another few months
at most, under increasingly difficult circumstances. Doctors testified that
she had at least a 75 percent chance of developing hydrocephalus, which
would be extremely difficult to treat because of her other abnormalities;
consequently, her brain damage would likely increase. Lack of oxygen
also would cause progressive cellular and brain damage. She would be at
risk of suffering epileptic fits. Most significantly, it was not clear to the
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physicians involved whether she was able to suffer pain (Re A (children)
(conjoined twins) (Ward LJ) [2000] 4 All ER 961, 982–85).
As Cardinal Murphy-O’Connor (2000, pp. 270–71) notes, Johnson J.
does say that “the few months of Mary’s life not separated from her twin
would not simply be worth nothing to her, they would be hurtful” (Cen-
tral Manchester Healthcare Trust and Mr. and Mrs. A and Re A Child.
[2000] Case No. FD0P10893 (High Court Justice-Family Division), p.
5). In fairness, he ought to have noted in addition that Johnson J. never
said that Mary herself was worth nothing as a person. Moreover, he also
ought to have noted that the decisive factor in Johnson J.’s judgment that
Mary would be hurt by living a few more months was not her lack of
intelligence, her facial deformation, or any other abnormality that she
suffered. In fact, it was not the many ways in which Mary might differ
from a “normal” baby that counted for him, but the one way in which
she might be exactly the same: Johnson J. was worried that she might
have a capacity to suffer pain. He writes:
So I asked, what would happen as the weeks went by and Jodie moved,
tried to crawl, to turn over in her sleep, to sit up. Would she not, I asked be
pulling Mary with her. Linked together as they are, not simply by bone but
by tissue, flesh and muscle, would not Mary be hurt and be in pain. In pain
but not able to cry. One very experienced doctor said she thought it was a
horrendous scenario, as she put it, being dragged around and not able to
do anything about it. (Central Manchester Healthcare Trust and Mr. and
Mrs. A and Re A Child. [2000] Case No. FD0P10893 (High Court Justice-
Family Division), p. 5)
To Johnson J., it ultimately did not matter whether Mary was mentally
gifted or mentally damaged. In the end, it only mattered that she was a
baby who was dying. Consequently, he recognized that the only relevant
question was whether she would die quickly and peacefully or “in pain
but not able to cry.” This is not an invidious judgment that denigrates
Mary on the basis of her handicap. It is a judgment that one would make
about any dying baby, no matter what her state of “normalcy.”
In sum, the quality-of-life judgments made with respect to Mary do
not seem to raise any of the three worries that I have discussed about such
judgments being made by surrogate decision makers in the case of incom-
petent patients. First, there was little or no danger that the surrogate de-
cision makers—whether parents or the state—would inappropriately privi-
lege their own interests by adopting the course of action that would result
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in her shortened life. At most, she was predicted to live another few months.
Second, there was little or no danger that the surrogate decision makers
would surreptitiously impose their own value judgments about dignity in
discerning the burdens of Mary’s continued existence. No decision maker
would ever face the few months of babyhood left for Mary; there was no
chance that she would grow up handicapped in a way that they could
analogize to their own situation. Third, the “burdens” considered by the
judge are not the sort likely to be invidiously discriminatory—they focus
on whether she will suffer physical pain if she lives, not on whether she
will be unjustly humiliated for being “different.”
In contrast, as noted above, the quality-of-life judgments made with
respect to Jodie do raise serious problems on all three counts. But these
are very difficult to see if the case is viewed only through the lens pro-
vided by a Bland analysis. More specifically, if we follow the Bland anal-
ogy too closely, the prospect that Jodie could be the object of invidious
quality-of-life judgments will simply not occur to us, because she will be
cast not in the personal role of “vulnerable patient,” which has been as-
signed to Mary, but rather in the instrumental role of “life support” to be
withdrawn or continued. Indeed, the degree to which Cardinal Murphy-
O’Connor’s submission disregards Jodie’s well-being is striking. The vast
majority of the submission is devoted to defending Mary’s dignity against
the perceived attack by Johnson J.; Jodie appears as a subject of concern
only in a cursory comment that her care might be an excessive burden if
she survived (Murphy-O’Connor 2000, p. 270).
Unfortunately, by focusing upon the larger structure of Johnson J.’s
opinion—and particularly its invocation of Bland—one may lose the trees
for the forest in a way that is uncharacteristic of the Catholic casuistical
tradition at its best. By too quickly assuming that the case of the con-
joined twins is adequately treated as an instantiation of the Bland case,
one risks subsuming concern for the well-being of these particular babies
into a broader debate about the appropriate legal framework for end-of-
life decision making. That debate, of course, is extremely important, and
must be engaged—but not at the expense of full and fair consideration of
complicated cases on their own terms. In both law and moral theology,
the strength of a casuistical approach is its willingness to do justice to the
exigencies of a single situation in all its particularity. In my view, true
respect for the dignity of each incompetent person in all her uniqueness
demands nothing less.
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CONCLUSION
In this article, I have attempted to apply the distinction between ordi-
nary and extraordinary means of prolonging life to one of the most highly
publicized medical-moral cases to have arisen in the past several years:
the case of Jodie and Mary, the Maltese conjoined twins. In so doing, I
have attempted both to critique and to extend the Roman Catholic
tradition’s use of that distinction by reasoning analogously from that case
to other cases that have received much attention from Catholic moralists
in recent years. I hope my analysis can shed some light both on the par-
ticular cases at issue and on the broader methodological question of the
role of casuistry in moral analysis.
In my view, the surgical separation should be viewed as an ordinary—
not an extraordinary—means of preserving Jodie’s life. In this essay, I
have not considered all the factors that need to be taken into account to
support such a conclusion, nor defended each of my judgments with re-
spect to them. Instead, I have focused my attention on two reasons com-
monly given to support the judgment that the surgical separation is an
extraordinary means: the possibility that Jodie’s long-term treatment would
require her prolonged or even permanent separation from her parents
and the fear that she would be unjustly discriminated against on the basis
of handicap once she returned to her family home in Malta. While the
first of these arguments need to be taken seriously, it is not ultimately
compelling with respect to Jodie’s situation. The second argument is, I
have argued, a clear example of an invidious quality-of-life judgment.
First, I have suggested that it is instructive to compare the way that
some Catholic moralists have assessed the motivations of women who
would rather lose their children to abortion than to adoption, on the one
hand, with the assessment given to the sentiment expressed by the twins’
parents that it would be better for Jodie to die than to relinquish custody
of her, on the other. As a result of the comparison, I concluded that one
needs to be rather more charitable in interpreting the sentiment expressed
by an overwhelming number of women facing crisis pregnancies that put-
ting up the baby for adoption is an unacceptable option, and rather more
suspicious of the reluctance indicated by the twins’ parents to abandon
their only living daughter to be raised by someone else. More broadly, I
believe that this comparison suggests that wise analyses of cases requires
one to be critically aware of one’s own assumptions regarding the charac-
ter of the agents whose actions are being evaluated. One may be too harsh
with respect to women facing crisis pregnancies based on the assumption
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that they are selfish and irresponsible and too deferential to the twins’
mother and father based on the assumption that they are loving and self-
abnegating parents.
Second, I have argued that assessments of the quality-of-life judgments
made about Mary and Jodie can be checked by comparing them to the
reactions to similar judgments made about Baby Doe, a boy born about
20 years ago with Down’s syndrome and an esophageal atresia and tra-
cheoesophageal fistula. At the concrete level of the cases, I argued that
the quality-of-life judgments made about Mary were not invidiously dis-
criminatory, because they focused on the pain that she might suffer in the
few remaining months of her life. In contrast, I suggested that the judg-
ments made about Jodie’s quality of life were even more problematic than
those made about Baby Doe: they focused mainly upon the psychological
burdens involved in raising a child perceived to be abnormal in a society
that perceives the abnormal as malevolently different from everyone else.
On a more abstract, methodological level, I argued that the failure of
some Catholic moralists—including Cardinal Murphy-O’Connor—to rec-
ognize this situation can be attributed to the fact that they too quickly
assimilated the particular details of the conjoined twins’ case to the broad
contours of the public policy debate about ethics and law at the end of life.
In my view, however, the tendency to do precisely that must be firmly
resisted. In the present era of international media and instantaneous com-
munication, it is tempting to treat the case of the conjoined twins as the
latest instantiation of a familiar “clash of values”: sanctity of life versus
quality of life, the culture of life versus the culture of death, religion ver-
sus science. In so doing, we fail to recognize that the central figures in this
case are not shadowy symbols of humanity but real babies with real claims
on us in justice and in love. In resolving their claims, we may find that the
conflicts for which we steel ourselves do not in fact materialize.
NOTES
1. The opinions issued by the judges in the Court of Appeal meticulously re-
view the diagnosis and prognosis with respect to both twins. It is significant
to note that these opinions reveal not even a hint of disagreement with re-
spect to these issues.
2. This decision to locate decision-making authority in the patient does not
mean that the judgment about whether a given means is ordinary or extraor-
dinary is entirely subjective—i.e., that it is constituted by the patient’s prefer-
ences in this regard. One might decide, for a variety of reasons, to locate
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decision-making authority in the patient while simultaneously affirming that
the patient should view the decision as a determination that she should make
objectively, but by taking into account her subjective experience of the weight
of certain burdens and burdens, as well as the experience of other people
affected by her decision. To say that a decision to forgo treatment is not
entirely subjective allows for the possibility of challenging a particular patient’s
decision. For example, one could say that a patient who views a treatment
option as a burden because it requires her to be examined by a physician of
a different race is objectively mistaken, despite her subjective experience in
this regard. Needless to say, even the correct judgment that a competent
patient’s judgment to forgo a treatment option is mistaken does not by itself
justify overriding it by forcing the unwanted treatment upon her. Indeed, the
Ethical and Religious Directives do not contemplate taking this course of
action, which would be considered a battery under American law.
3. “[W]eight should also be given to the likely burdensome consequences of
surgery for Jodie and her parents” (Murphy-O’Connor 2000, p. 270).
4. Christopher Kaczor (forthcoming) explicitly and uncritically draws upon this
argument in contending that the surgery counts as an extraordinary means.
See, also, Latovic and Nelson (2001) for a very helpful, if somewhat dated,
survey of Catholic opinion on the case.
5. The most direct criticism in the Catholic literature that I have seen is found
in Latovic and Nelson (2001, p. 608): “While considerable, we do not think
that these burdens were any more than other parents deal with in caring for
handicapped children, some of whom are even in worse conditions.” I have
come across only one pointed challenge to the wish on the part of the par-
ents and others to let Jodie die on the grounds that it was discriminatory
against the disabled (Toolis 2000). This reason for the parental refusal was
noted in the judgment issued by the lower court judge who heard the case
(High Court Justice-Family Division 2000, p. 5) and so was at issue when
the submission on behalf of Archbishop Murphy-O’Connor was being pre-
pared. His statement, however, makes no mention of discrimination against
the handicapped being an issue with respect to Jodie.
6. See e.g., Lyon (1985), McHaffie and Fowlie (1996), Ramsey (1978), Sparks
(1988), Walter and Shannon (1990), and Weir (1984). For a helpful sum-
mary of the legal issues, see Merrick (1995).
7. He was a “blue baby,” and his initial Apgar score—used to evaluate a
newborn’s physical state—was 2 out of a possible 10. The baby also had an
abnormally enlarged heart, which was not unexpected since cardiac defects
are not uncommon in babies with Down’s syndrome—one of the reasons
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that their life expectancy is substantially shorter than that of others (Lyon
1985, pp. 23–26).
8. Baby Doe’s parents were not wealthy people; they also had two other chil-
dren. At the time they made their decision—well before the passage of the
Americans with Disabilities Act—public services and facilities for persons
with Down’s syndrome in the United States were not extensive. In contrast,
it was unlikely that the financial burdens associated with caring for Jodie
would have been particularly onerous. Due to the special circumstances of
her birth, it was likely that most of the special care that Jodie would need
would have been provided by the English medical system. In addition, as
was predictable given the tremendous media coverage the case had received,
her parents were able to work out an arrangement for an exclusive inter-
view, for which they were paid a great deal of money that would cover future
expenses associated with her care.
9. The three judges who heard the case for the Court of Appeal rejected Justice
Johnson’s analogy of the surgical separation to withdrawal of treatment,
largely because they could not bring themselves to analyze the operation an
“omission”—how withholding and withdrawing treatment are character-
ized under the law—rather than as an “act.”
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